Здравейте! Не се шокирайте от дългата тема... едва ли ще я прочетат повече от 2-3ма човека в най-добрия случай, но след зачестилия ми хейт направих малко проучване от гледна точка на психологията за този проблем и реших да я споделя и тук. Айде сега няма да ви поквари спама, заслужава място тук. xD. Планирано беше да я преведа, но след 1/10 се отказах и реших, че не е нужно, след като 80% и повече знаят английски и не бих го превел по-добре от колкото те биха го разбрали на съответния език. Също така ще разберете защо това е по-подходящо на anime fan-овете... за хейтинга говоря. xD
Работата и анализите са от Hanne De Jaegher психолог от Cognitive Science в университета Sussex.
Minds
in
Synchrony
How do we understand
each other
in
everyday encounters?
[Abstract]
To the question “how do people understand each other in everyday
situations?”, one of the most influential answers given by
experimental and developmental psychology is: through the use of
a Theory of Mind (ToM) (see, e.g. Baron-Cohen 1995). A recent
potent criticism of this account of social cognition comes from
Shaun Gallagher (2001) who points out that, when attempting to
answer the above question, we should not concentrate on the use
of a theory, but on the ‘embodied practice’, which, according to him,
constitutes the basis of our social aptitude. According to Gallagher,
a theory of mind is a special and rather rarely used way of
understanding others. He further suggests that theory of mind
cannot “capture the full range of second-person interactions”
(Gallagher 2001, p. 86). Instead he claims that the processes that
advocates of theory of mind propose as precursors to the fullblown
ToM-mechanism, are in fact normally sufficient to understand
other people such that we can have our ordinary social interactions
with them.
On Gallagher’s account, the hierarchy of capacities involved in
interpersonal understanding and fluent social interaction is as
follows. Underlying all our social activities are “embodied practices”.
From these embodied practices we derive “specific pre-theoretical
knowledge about how people behave in particular contexts”
(Gallagher 2001, p. 90), in other words the know-how of social
interaction. This social know-how is present in processes of
imitation, intentionality detection, eye-tracking, perception of
goal-related or intentional movements and the perception of
emotion and meaning in posture and movement. In Gallagher’s
interpretation, these capacities constitute what Trevarthen
(after Habermas) has called “primary intersubjectivity”
(Trevarthen 1979), which is the possession of “an acitve and
immediately responsive conscious appreciation of [others’]
communicative intentions” in interaction (Trevarthen and Aitken
2001, p. 5).
If, in Gallagher’s view, embodied practices underlie even the precursors to
ToM or the capacities of primary intersubjectivity, then what are
these embodied practices?
In the 1970s and 80s, a lot of research has been done on interaction
rhythms. Interaction rhythms are “recurring patterns of face-to-face
interaction” (Davis 1982, p. 23). Even though this work took place
at the same time as research into theory of mind, it has been
largely overlooked by ToM-theorists. Interaction rhythms are not
usually considered as precursors to ToM. It is not clear whether
this is because theory of mind investigators were unaware of this
research, or whether they did not think it was worth considering, or
whether they did not see how it could be related to their work.
I argue that interactional rhythms are probably even more basic than the
precursors to ToM, and than the processes and capacities of
primary intersubjectivity. In other words, I think they may be what
Gallagher dubs embodied practices. Gallagher never uses the word
‘mechanism’ when he talks about embodied practices, but I wish to
interpret them as such, and to argue that, thus interpreted, they
may be interactional rhythms.
I explain interactional rhythms, and discuss the extent to which they are
related to, and can further explicate the “Practice of Mind” of
Gallagher’s article.
[The question]How do people
understand each other
in their everyday interactions?
[Answer1: Theory of Mind]
One of the most influential answers given by experimental and developmental psychology to the
question of social cognition has been that people use a Theory of Mind (see e.g. B-C 1995).
Theory of Mind is a widely accepted, well-established and acknowledged paradigm about social cognition
with its own field of research within experimental and developmental psychology. It accounts for how
people understand and predict each other’s behavior.
A ToM is a computational mechanism in the head which is responsible for a capacity dubbed
‘mind-reading’. More precisely, it draws inferences about others’ mental states by reckoning
with propositional states which contain information coming from
perceptions of people’s behavior,
knowledge of the world,
and knowledge of regularities of the social world.
We use these inferences to predict and explain other people’s behaviour.
This is what understanding other people entails under the ToM-view.
[Problems of Theory of Mind]
However, Gallagher argues in his (2001) that
we do not first and foremost explain and predict each other’s behaviour.
Rather, we evaluate behaviour affectively and react to others’ actions with
behaviour of our own.
In his (2001), Gallagher sums up some of the most potent criticisms of ToM.
Throughout his article, Gallagher argues that we do not
primarily use an inference mechanism to understand others.
He argues that before we have a capacity to reason about
mental states, we already show social understanding*.
Also, even though we may later develop the capacity to
reason about mental states (which is the capacity upon
which our social aptitude rests in the ToM paradigm),
we primarily use something else to understand each
other in daily life
**.
*
For example, the experiment with 1-
year-olds who seemed to negotiate with
their mothers, looking at her facial
expression, whether a visual cliff was
safe to cross or not. (Sorce et al.
1985)
**
E.g. consider the following dialogue:
woman: I’m leaving you
man: Who is he?
This is an example taken from Baron-
Cohen’s (1995), used by Gallagher in his (2001). According to Baron-Cohen, what would happen if we
would overhear this conversation is that we would infer that the man thinks that the woman is leaving him
for someone else.
Gallagher offers a different explanation though. According to him, what we do upon hearing this, is not to
start reasoning about what might be going on, but rather: we have an immediate evaluative
understanding, which shows itself in our actions, which might be e.g. to leave the room, or to take
sides, etc.
[Precursors to theory of mind]
Where does the ToM mechanism come from?
Precursors to ToM are such things as:
imitation
intentionality detection
eye-tracking
joint attention
perception of goal-related or intentional movements
perception of emotion and meaning in posture and movement
[Answer2: The “embodied practice of mind” Shaun Gallagher (2001)]
According to Gallagher, and I agree with him, this is where the social action is: already in the
so-called precursors to ToM.
Gallagher turns the ToM story on its head, and places the precursors on top. It is in imitation,
eye-direction detection, joint attention, intentionality detection and so on that we exercise our
minds. It is here that we, quite literally and visibly,
practice our minds.This practice of mind is what enables us to understand each other. Note that this kind of
‘understanding’ is very different from the scientific understanding that ToM has proposed.
Gallagher’s understanding is an “emotional, sensory-motor, perceptual and nonconceptual”
comprehension (2001, p. 85) which is reminiscent of the phenomenological school and of
the turn towards embodiment in cognitive science.
[Practice of mind]
Gallagher’s
Practice of Mind is also related to Trevarthen’s “
primary intersubjectivity”.
Gallagher:
Цитат:
“For our understanding of other people, I am suggesting that we rarely need to go
beyond contextualized overt behaviours (actions, gestures, speech acts, etc.). We
are rarely required to postulate an idealized and abstract mental belief standing
behind these behaviours in order to grasp the disposition that is overtly constituted
and expressed in the contextualized behaviour. In certain contextualized interaction I
need go no further than the person’s gestures or emotional expressions to gain my
understanding of how it is with that person.” (2001, p. 96)
[b]BUT HOW?
[/b]
[Practice of mind]
The problem with approaches such as ToM and even
Simulation theory, and also with neuroscientific studies
of social behaviour is that, until now, they do not
capture the subtle quality, the intricacies and the
apparent immediacy of social understanding.
I think this is because
1) they consider social understanding to take place
in an individual, rather than in the interaction, and
2) they situate social understanding in the head,
rather than in the interaction, in the context, in
the world.
--------
E.g. What you cannot say at the
moment of giving a friend a cuddle, when
afterwards you realise that this person was sad
indeed.
The attraction and the pleasure
when you dance with someone and the dancing
works.
This problem runs parallel to an issue
in general cognitive science:
the shift from cognitivism to
embodiment
What are the embodied practices of mind? Whence the “direct, pragmatic
understanding of another person’s intentions because their intentions are
explicitly expressed in their embodied actions"?
[Interactional rhythms]
In the 1970’s and 80’s, a lot of research has been done on
interaction rhythms.
These are “recurring patterns of face to face interaction” (Davis 1982, p. 23).
[Interactional rhythms]
Some examples of research suggesting the existence of interaction rhythms:
W i l l iam Condon (see e.g. his 1979 and 1986) did frame-by-frame analysis of films of dialogues.
He found that the speaker’s gestures synchronize with his speech and moreover, the listener
entrains to the speaker’s speech! and movements. He has also found that children with autism
entrain differently to sound.
György Gergely’s contingency preference hypothesis. Gergely hypothesizes that around 3
months of age, infants shift from seeking perfect contingency -found in the movements of their
own body (cf. Piaget’s circular movements)- to seeking high-but-imperfect contingency -which is
found in imitation by other people, in the exploration of effects of movements of your own body
on the environment, and in game-like interactions.
Gergely further hypothesizes that this shift does not (or at least not fully) takes place in autism.
According to Gergely, children with autism persevere in seeking perfect contingency, which
results in e.g. stereotypical behaviour, executive function problems, aversion to social objects,
an inattention to faces, a lack of social responsiveness, and a lack of social understanding.
[Answer3: Interactional temporal flexibility]
Based on: - the call for situating social cognition in the world (rather than in the head),
- further, the question what Gallagher’s ‘embodied practices’ are,
- research suggesting that people with autism -who are socially challenged- react to
sounds in a temporally different way, which suggests that they may also have other
temporal idiosyncrasies
- and research suggesting that people entrain or coordinate their speech and
movements with each other when they are in interaction,
I suggest that the basis of our social aptitude lies in an
interactional temporal
flexibility.
[Interactional temporal flexibility]
What is interactional temporal flexibility?
A capacity to be temporally flexible in interaction.
When you are temporally flexible in interaction, you interlock with your
interaction partner at the level of the timing of your movements and
utterances.
The resulting interlocking pattern only emerges in the interaction.
An important developmental aspect: there is probably a sensitivity to
temporality very early in life, and when something goes wrong with this
sensitivity, the infant will have trouble relating to her primary caregiver,
and the specific ways in which this early relating goes wrong will lead to
a specific pattern of cognitive and emotional difficulties later in life, such
as autism*.
*People with autism, who are generally less flexible (see their preference for rituals, for
things to remain the same, events to be predictable etc., Kanner 1943), and who seem
to have sensori-motor problems with temporality (Condon 1979), are less socially able.
[Interactional temporal flexibility]
An assumption of the interactional temporal flexibility thesis is that temporality plays an important, if
not crucial, role in social interaction.
Some hypotheses result from this:
- A further hypothesis concerning Condon’s work would be that people who are not
synchronizing properly with their interaction partner will not understand that person*.
There is research which suggests that this may be the case. See Trevarthen’s double video link
experiments with infants (replicated by Nadel et al. 1999).
- Another hypothesis is that social interactions can be distinguished from non-social interactions
(interactions with objects for example, or interactions between objects) by their temporal
characteristics (see e.g. Di Paolo 2000 & Ikegami 2003: turn taking in simulated evolved
robots).
*Even though, much later in life, when we have developed a capacity to reason about other
people’s mental states, this loss of communication can be bypassed by the former capacity.
In this case still, however, I do not think that reasoning about other people’s mental states,
or even simulating, happens just in the head. The ‘reasoning’ has a direct influence on the
timing of our gestures and utterances, and possibly also on our sensitivity for temporal
patterns in interaction.
[Interactional temporal flexibility]
Why temporal flexibility?
-> 1)because I think that the temporal aspect is the most basic one to social interaction, that social
interaction is differentiated from other interactions by the specific temporality of social
interactions
-> 2)because if the temporal aspect is the primary, skeletal aspect of social interaction, we can
possibly open a door to explaining some developmental conundrums, e.g. explain how early
social interaction can go wrong, and, I conjecture, also how early problems in social interaction
can develop very precise cognitive profiles, e.g. autism.
Why flexibility?
-> you need flexibility to interact with many different people, in many different situations, where the
temporal constraints may be different, but the temporal interlocking pattern between interaction
partners still has to occur for their to be communication.
I am looking for the most basic mechanism of social interaction.
[Interactional temporal flexibility]
There is work that suggests that we ‘interlock’ in order to perceive:
Port, Cummins and McAuley (1995) have proposed a mechanism for audition based on
adaptive oscillators. Here, the auditory mechanism puts itself into phase with the stimulus, and
this is how we perceive and recognize auditory signals.
Here, we perceive and recognize auditory stimuli as they take place, whereas in traditional
approaches to audition, the auditory stimulus was proposed to be represented as a spectogram
first and then retrospectively inspected. It seems much more parsimonious to be able to deal
with sounds as they come in.*
Moreover, in this model, the auditory system, based in this mechanism of adaptive oscillators,
will only recognize sounds that are familiar to it. Here, things we don’t recognize are left out of
the auditory system.
*The authors point to the difference between scientific time and dynamic time. In traditional
approaches to audition, it is assumed that biological time equals scientific time, i.e.
absolute time, or time in discrete steps. The mechanism they propose, on the contrary,
deals with time dynamically, i.e. time can be measured relative to the features of the
stimulus: “predictable features of the stimulus itself provide the yardstick for the
measurement of time” (Port, Cummins and McAuley 1995, p. 365).
[Interactional temporal flexibility: conclusion]
Interactional temporal flexibility
- places social cognition firmly in the world, in the interaction.
- offers an answer to the question what Gallagher’s ‘embodied practices’ are.
Gallagher’s embodied practices can be made more tangible, measurable.
- possibly offers an explanation of the quality and the feel of immediacy of social
understanding.
Work is underway on:
- which kind of experiment can test only for the temporal aspect of social
interaction?